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Stable Invitations
Hooyeon Lee and Yoav Shoham
Abstract
We consider the situation in which an organizer is trying to convene an event, and
needs to choose a subset of agents to be invited. Agents have preferences over
how many attendees should be at the event and possibly also who the attendees
should be. This induces a stability requirement: All invited agents should prefer
attending to not attending, and all the other agents should not regret being not
invited. The organizer’s objective is to find the invitation of maximum size subject
to the stability requirement. We investigate the computational complexity of finding
the maximum stable invitation when all agents are truthful, as well as the mechanism
design problem when agents may strategically misreport their preferences.
1 Introduction
Imagine an event organizer trying to convene an event – for example, a fundraiser. Let us
assume for now (as we will do in most of the paper) that the time and venue for the event
are fixed, and that the only remaining decision for the organizer to make is whom to invite
among a set of agents. An invitation is simply defined to be a subset of agents. The goal of
the organizer is to find maximum invitations (for example, in order to maximize the total
donations), but the potential invitees have their own preferences over how many attendees
there should be at the event and possibly also who the potential attendees should be. For
example, a given donor may not want to attend if few attendees show up, but she may also
want the event not to be overly crowded. Another donor may want to attend the event only
if her friends attend and her business competitor does not.
We first consider agents with anonymous preferences over invitations – agents only care
about how many attendees are at the event (but not the identities of attendees). An
invitation is stable if all invitees prefer attending to not attending and if no uninvited person
wishes she had been invited. Stability is obviously desirable, but a stable invitation may not
exist in general. This naturally raises the question of how hard it is to determine whether
it exists for a given setting, and if it does, what the maximum stable invitation is. These
questions take an extra meaning in the strategic case, in which agents may misreport their
preferences. Can the organizer incentivize the agents to disclose their true preferences? We
call this problem the Anonymous Stable Invitation Problem (ASIP). If we assume truthful
agents, we have an algorithm design problem, and we report positive results in this case.
If we assume strategic agents, we have a mechanism design problem, and we report an
impossibility result in general as well as positive results for a special case of the problem.
We then relax the assumption of anonymous preferences and allow agents to specify
their constraints over the identities of attendees, in addition to their preferences over the
number of attendees. Formally, we allow each agent to specify her acceptance set of agents
and rejection set of agents such that she is willing to attend the event only if everyone in her
acceptance set also attends, no one in her rejection set attends, and the number of attendees
is acceptable to her. As before, an invitation is stable if all invitees prefer attending to not
attending and if no uninvited person wishes she had been invited. We again ask the following
natural questions: How hard it is to determine whether a stable invitation exists for a given
instance, and if it exists whether one can efficiently find the maximum stable invitation. We
call this problem the General Stable Invitation Problem (GSIP). In the non-strategic case
we show that one can efficiently find a maximum stable invitation in some cases, but in
general the problem is NP-hard. In the strategic case, an impossibility for the anonymous
case implies the same impossibility for the general case. But we also show an impossibility
result for the case in which agents only care about the identities of attendees (and not about
the number of attendees).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss previous work in the
literature. In Section 3 we formally define the Anonymous Stable Invitation Problem, and
investigate both the non-strategic and strategic cases. In Section 4 we relax the assumption
of anonymous preferences and formally define the General Stable Invitation Problem. We
then investigate the non-strategic and strategic cases of the general problem. In Section 5
we discuss the contribution of this work and directions for future work.
2 Related Work
The problems we consider in this work can be viewed as a group scheduling problem in
which the goal is to find an agreeable outcome for a group of agents, subject to certain
constraints and objectives. Ephrati et al. [5] tackle incentive issues with strategic agents
in a group scheduling setting, and propose three monetary-based meeting systems. Their
systems are extensions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, in which invitees can bid
their preferences using monetary “points.” They assume that a central host has an access
to the calendars of invitees, but in this work we do not make this assumption. In addition
we do not consider monetary-based mechanisms in this work.
Another closely related work is done by Lu and Boutilier [10]. Lu and Boutilier consider
the problem of group purchasing, in which the sellers provide volume discounts for a large
group of buyers and the objective is to find a (Nash) stable matching between the buyers and
sellers that maximizes social welfare. Although the settings are quite different, it is worth
noting that the problems we discuss in this work can be generalized to stable matching
problems (we discuss such generalization in Section 5). To differentiate from the work of
Lu and Boutilier, we emphasize that we consider both truthful and strategic agents and we
do not consider coalitions in this work, while they assumed truthful agents and considered
coalitions among agents.
The most closely related work of which we are aware is done by Darmann et al. [1].
There the authors consider the Group Activity Selection Problem (GASP), in which the
objective is to find an assignment of agents to activities where agents are assumed to have
anonymous preferences over activities as well as number-of-participants. We remark that
the Anonymous Stable Invitation Problem (ASIP in Section 3) can be viewed as a sub-class
of GASP with a single activity.1 Yet there are several differences between our work and the
work by Darmann et al. First, our main results are anchored in the General Stable Invitation
Problem (GSIP in Section 4) where agents no longer have anonymous preferences. Second,
while Darmann et al. provides various hardness results for GASP, they do not directly imply
similar hardness results for GSIP. Finally, in both ASIP and GSIP, we consider strategic
agents and strategy-proof mechanisms, while Darmann et al. only considers non-strategic
(truthful) agents for GASP.
We also remark that the Stable Invitations Problems (both ASIP and GSIP) are closely
related to hedonic games.2 Ballester [12] provides a number of computational complexity
1In particular, our easiness result shown in Section 3.3.1 can be derived from the work of Darmann et al.
However we remark that other easiness and hardness results of ours are not directly implied by the work of
Darmann et al.
2Much work has been devoted to analyzing optimality and stability of various hedonic coalition struc-
tures (see [7], [8], and [9]). In this work we take a solution concept of stability for granted and focus on
results (in fact, hardness results) for finding a core-stable, Nash-stable, or individually ra-
tional outcome in hedonic games and anonymous hedonic games. These hardness results
do not imply similar hardness results for GSIP for two reasons. First, the hardness re-
sults on anonymous hedonic games do not hold for GSIP because GSIP is not equivalent
to anonymous hedonic games. Second, while an instance of GSIP can be transformed into
a (non-anonymous) hedonic game in a na¨ıve manner by listing all possible coalitions, this
transformation blows up the size of an input instance representation exponentially.3 There-
fore we remark that our easiness and hardness results discussed in this work are not a direct
derivative of the work by Darmann et al. or Ballester.
3 Anonymous Stable Invitation Problem
In this section we formally define the Anonymous Stable Invitation Problem (ASIP), and
investigate the non-strategic case and the strategic case of ASIP.
3.1 Definitions and Notation
Definition 1. An instance of the Anonymous Stable Invitation Problem (ASIP) is a pair
(N,P ) where N = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is a set of n agents and P is an n-tuple of preferences of
agents where P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn). For each agent ai, we define Pi to be a total preorder
(i) on the set of outcomes, X = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} where an outcome x ∈ (X \ {0}) denotes
the number of attendees and x = 0 denotes the outside option of not attending. For
any x1, x2 ∈ (X \ {0}), x1 i x2 is interpreted as agent ai weakly preferring attending
the event if x1 attendees are present (including herself) to attending if x2 attendees are
present (including herself). We use ≻i and ∼i to denote the induced strict preferences and
indifference relations, respectively. We drop the subscript (i) if it is clear from the context.
We assume that for each agent ai and each x ∈ (X \ {0}), either x ≻i 0 or 0 ≻i x. In
words, no agent is indifferent between her outside option of not attending and any other
outcome. This assumption is made for convenience and does not change our technical results.
If the organizer na¨ıvely invites everyone with the goal of maximizing attendance, some
invitees might prefer not to attend – this leads to individual rationality. On the other
hand, if the organizer leaves out some agents with the hope of pleasing the rest, this might
upset some of those not invited – this leads to envy-freeness. We now formally define stable
invitations.
Definition 2. An invitation S for an instance (N,P ) is a subset of N , and is interpreted
as the organizer inviting the agents in S. An invitation S is said to be individually rational
if for every agent ai ∈ S it holds that |S| ≻i 0. An invitation S is said to be envy-free
4 if
for every agent ai 6∈ S it holds that |S ∪ {ai}| = (|S|+ 1) ≺i 0. An invitation is stable if it
is both individually rational and envy-free.
For each agent ai, we can naturally induce from Pi her preference over the set of all
invitations because the preference between any two invitations is induced by the cardinality
of each invitation. We overload our notation (∼i,i,≻i) for the induced preferences over
computational and game-theoretic complexity of finding a solution.
3In contrast, any instance of ASIP can be transformed into a (non-anonymous) hedonic game, and it is
described concisely in the work of Darmann et al. However, since we provide an easiness result for ASIP in
this work, Bellester’s hardness results are not applicable in ASIP.
4Another notion of envy can be defined as an agent who is not invited but desires the spot of another
agent who is invited. We do not consider this notion in this work, but it is an interesting direction for future
work to see how our technical results would change.
invitations. Formally, for any invitation S with ai 6∈ S, we define that S ∼i 0 because ai is
not invited. Between any invitation S with ai ∈ S and another invitation S′ with ai ∈ S′,
the preference between S and S′ is induced by the preference between |S| and |S′| (be it
∼i,i,≻i). The preference between S with ai ∈ S and S′ with ai 6∈ S′ is induced by the
preference between |S| and 0 (because S′ ∼i 0). The preferences of agents over invitations
are now well-defined.
Let us define a special class of preferences of agents, called single-peaked preferences.
An agent is said to have a single-peaked preference if the set of outcomes that she strictly
prefers to not attending is single-peaked.
Definition 3. Given an instance (N,P ), let Yi = {x ∈ X : x ≻i 0} be a subset of outcomes
that ai prefers to 0. ai is said to have a single-peaked preferences (SPK) if there exist
outcomes li ∈ Yi and hi ∈ Yi such that x ∈ Yi if and only if li ≤ x ≤ hi for any x ∈ X
and there exists an ideal outcome oi ∈ Yi such that if k1 ≤ k2 ≤ oi or k1 ≥ k2 ≥ oi, then
k2 i k1 for all k1, k2 ∈ Y .5 If Yi = ∅, then we set oi = 0 for convenience.
There are two important special cases of SPK-preferences: Increasing preferences (INC-
preferences) and decreasing preferences (DEC-preferences). We say that agent ai has an
INC-preference (DEC-preference, respectively) if hi = oi = n (if li = oi = 1, respec-
tively). Although we assume that agents can have arbitrary preferences, we will see that
INC-preferences and DEC-preferences play an important role in the strategic case in Sec-
tion 3.4.
3.2 Examples
Example 1 (Stable invitations are not unique). Let us consider three agents N =
{a1, a2, a3} and the set of outcomes X = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Each agent’s preference ordering
over X is given by:
P1 : 1 ≻ 0 ≻ 2 ∼ 3 , P2 : 1 ≻ 0 ≻ 2 ∼ 3 , P3 : 0 ≻ 1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3.
Note that a1 and a2 have DEC-preferences with o1 = o2 = 1 and that a3 is unwilling
to attend with o3 = 0. Since a3 is not willing to attend, any invitation that contains a3 is
not individually rational. Among the remaining four possible invitations with a1 and a2,
the empty invitation (i.e., S = ∅) is not envy-free and the invitation S = {a1, a2} is not
individually rational. The two stable invitations are {a1} and {a2}.
Example 2 (A stable invitation may not exist). Let us consider two agents N = {a1, a2}
whose preference orderings are:
P1 : 1 ≻ 0 ≻ 2 , P2 : 2 ≻ 0 ≻ 1.
Note that a1 has a DEC-preference (o1 = l1 = h1 = 1) and a2 has an INC-preference
(o2 = l2 = h2 = 2). The empty invitation (i.e., S = ∅) is not envy-free because a1 prefers
attending the event. The invitation S = {a1} not envy-free, S = {a2} is not individually
rational, and the full invitation (i.e., S = N) is not individually rational. Therefore there is
no stable invitation.
3.3 The Non-strategic Case
We first investigate the non-strategic case of ASIP with truthful agents. We assume that
agents can have arbitrary preferences over the size of invitations.
5Note that li, hi, oi may or may not be different.
3.3.1 Easiness Result
We present an efficient algorithm that determines whether a stable invitation exists and
finds a maximum stable invitation (if it exists), when given any instance of ASIP. Note that
a maximum stable invitation needs not be unique.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Finding Maximum Stable Invitation
1: Input: (N,P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn})
2: for k := n, n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 2, 1 do
3: Z ← {ai ∈ N : k ≻i 0}
4: if |Z| ≥ k then
5: S ← Z
6: while |S| > k and ∃ai ∈ S such that 0 ≻i (k + 1) do
7: Pick any ai ∈ S such that 0 ≻i (k + 1)
8: S ← S \ {ai}
9: end while
10: if |S| = k and {aj 6∈ S : (k + 1) ≻j 0} = ∅ then
11: return S
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: if {ai ∈ N : 1 ≻i 0} = ∅ then
16: return S = ∅
17: end if
18: return NONE
Our algorithm is described in Algorithm 1, and it works as follows: The algorithm checks
whether a stable invitation of size k exists by iterating k in decreasing order (line 2). For
some fixed k, the algorithm finds a subset Z of N such that Z contains all the agents to
whom k ≻i 0 (line 3). The algorithm then checks if Z contains at least k agents (line 4).
If it does, then it obtains a subset S of Z by removing the agents to whom (k + 1) is not
an acceptable outcome (lines 5-9). The algorithm returns S if |S| = k and it is envy-free
(lines 10-12). If the algorithm does not return in line 11 for any k, then it checks weather
the empty invitation is stable; if it is, then it returns the empty invitation, otherwise it
determines that no stable invitations exist (lines 15-18). Note that our algorithm assumes
arbitrary preferences of agents.
Theorem 1 states our easiness result for the non-strategic case of ASIP. (A formal proof
can be found in a long version of this paper.)
Theorem 1. Given an instance of ASIP, Algorithm 1 terminates in polynomial time. If a
stable invitation exists the algorithm produces a maximum one, otherwise it determines that
no stable invitation exists.
3.3.2 An Extension to Multiple Alternatives for Time
Although we assumed that the time for the event is set in advance, there may exist many
alternatives for the time of the event. We can extend ASIP such that each agent can specify
her preferences over the pairs of (time, number-of-attendees). The organizer then chooses
both the time and the invitation, and the goal is to maximize the size of the invitation
subject to the same stability constraints. In this setting, the organizer can simply execute
Algorithm 1 iteratively for each time-alternative, and find a maximum stable invitation with
respect to the fixed time alternative. Therefore our easiness results can be naturally extended
to the case with multiple time-alternatives. Yet we remark that this extension complicates
the problem more severely if we assume strategic agents, as we discuss in Section 3.4.4.
3.4 The Strategic Case
The following example shows how an agent is incentivized to misreport her preferences.
Example 3 (An agent may be incentivized to misreport.). Suppose there are 3 agents
whose true preferences are:
P1 : 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 0 , P2 : 3 ≻ 0 ≻ 1 ∼ 2 , P3 : 3 ≻ 0 ≻ 1 ∼ 2.
Notice that agent a1 has a DEC-preference (with l1 = o1 = 1 and h1 = 3) while the other
two agents have INC-preferences (with oi = li = hi = 3 for i ∈ {2, 3}).
If all agents are truthful, the full invitation (S = {a1, a2, a3}) is maximum and stable.
Suppose agent a1 misreports her preference ordering as Pˆ1:
Pˆ1 : 1 ≻ 0 ≻ 2 ∼ 3.
Given the preferences {Pˆ1, P2, P3}, the maximum stable invitation is Sˆ = {a1}; the full
invitation S is seemingly no longer stable. Since a1 prefers Sˆ to S (as 1 ≻1 3), she has an
incentive to misreport her preference ordering.
3.4.1 Definitions and Notation
Let us formally define a mechanism in the context of ASIP with strategic agents. Although
we only provide a definition of a deterministic mechanism here, we discuss how one can
generalize the definition to a randomized mechanism at the end of this section.
Definition 4. Given an instance (N,P ) of ASIP, we define Vi (the set of available actions to
ai) to be the set of all preferences over X where X = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of outcomes.
A (deterministic) mechanism is a pair (V, Z) where V = (V1 × · · · × Vn) is the set of action
profiles of all agents and Z : V 7→ U is a mapping from each action profile to an invitation
in U where U = 2N . Let V−i = (V1 × · · · × Vi−1 × Vi+1 × · · · × Vn) be the set of action
profiles available to all agents but agent ai. A mechanism (V, Z) is said to be strategy-proof
if for all ai ∈ N it holds that Z(Pi, v−i) i Z(vi, v−i) for all vi ∈ Vi and v−i ∈ V−i.
3.4.2 Impossibility Result
We start with an impossibility result. Theorem 2 states that strategy-proofness of a mech-
anism and capability of finding a stable invitation are incompatible (let alone finding a
maximum one).
Theorem 2. When given an instance of ASIP, there is no strategy-proof mechanism that
finds a stable invitation (with respect to true preferences of agents), even if it exists.
Proof. Consider two agents with preferences:
P1 : 1 ≻ 0 ≻ 2 , P2 : 1 ≻ 0 ≻ 2.
Both agents prefer to attend the event alone, and there are only two stable invitations:
S1 = {a1} and S2 = {a2}. Let Vi be the set of all action profiles of agent ai, and let
V = V1 × V2. Consider any mapping Z from V to U = 2N . We will show that if (V, Z) is
a strategy-proof mechanism, Z must map (P1, P2) to neither S1 nor S2, which means that
the mechanism does not find a stable invitation.
If Z maps (P1, P2) to S1, then a2 has an incentive to report her preference untruthfully
as v2 ∈ V2 instead:
v2 : 1 ∼ 2 ≻ 0.
Given (P1, v2), the only stable invitation is now S2 = {a2} because {a1, a2} is not
individually rational, while neither ∅ nor S1 = {a1} is envy-free. Notice that a2 strictly
prefers S2 over S1 (because S1 ∼2 0 as a2 is not invited) and therefore a2 has an incentive
to deviate from P2 to v2. Similarly, if Z maps (P1, P2) to S2, then a1 has an incentive to
deviate from P1 to an untruthful preference ordering (namely, v1 : 1 ∼ 2 ≻ 0). Therefore
if a mechanism (V, Z) is strategy-proof, then Z must map (P1, P2) to neither S1 nor S2;
yet these two invitations are the only stable invitations given (P1, P2). Thus there is no
strategy-proof mechanism that can find a stable invitation for this instance.
The intuition behind the example used in our proof is simple. While the event organizer
is trying to maximize attendance, agents prefer minimizing attendance. This conflict of
interests can make it impossible for the organizer to find a stable invitation while ensuring
strategy-proofness.
Note that all of {P1, P2, v1, v2} used in our proof are DEC-preferences. Even if we limit
both V1 and V2 to be the set of DEC-preferences over X (instead of arbitrary preferences
over X), which limits the ability of agents to manipulate the mechanism, this impossibility
result still holds. This strengthens our impossibility result.
Given this impossibility result, we ask the following natural question: Is it possible for
a manipulator to determine efficiently, which action of his would lead to a more favorable
outcome (than his truthful action), provided that he knows preferences of all other agents?
The following lemma informally answers this question while we omit details due to space.
We also note that this lemma is still applicable when we extend ASIP to GSIP in next section.
Lemma 1 (Informal). There exists a polynomial time algorithm, given an instance (N,P ) of
GSIP and a mechanism (V, Z), that decides in polynomial time whether there exists a certain
preference ordering vi ∈ Vi of ai such that ai (strictly) prefers Z(vi, P−i) to Z(Pi, P−i).
3.4.3 Easiness Result (Strategy-proof Mechanism)
Let us now consider a special instance of ASIP in which all agents have INC-preferences; we
call such instances INC-instances of ASIP. Since each agent has an INC-preference, we can
induce the minimum threshold, li, of agent ai such that k ≻i 0 if and only if k ≥ li. In the
case where ai has no acceptable outcome (i.e., 0 ≻i x for all x ∈ (X \{0})), we simply define
li = n + 1. Let li denote the true induced minimum threshold of ai given Pi and Li the
reported induced minimum threshold of ai given vi (which may differ from Pi). Without loss
of generality, we can assume that agents report {Li} to the organizer (instead of reporting
preference orderings {vi}) and that Li values are sorted in non-decreasing order.
Algorithm 2 Strategy-proof Mechanism for Finding Maximum Stable Invitation
1: Input: (N, {Li : ai ∈ N})
2: for k := n, n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 2, 1 do
3: if Lk ≤ k then
4: return S = {a1, a2, . . . , ak−1, ak}
5: end if
6: end for
7: return S = ∅
Our (deterministic) mechanism is presented in Algorithm 2, and it works as follows: It
is given a sorted list of threshold values in non-decreasing order (line 1). The mechanism
determines whether a stable invitation of size k exists by iterating in decreasing order (line
2). If a stable invitation of size k exists (line 3), then it returns the invitation S that
contains precisely k agents (line 4). If no stable invitation has been found, then mechanism
determines that the empty invitation is the only stable invitation, and returns it in line 7.
Theorem 3. The mechanism described in Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time, and finds
a maximum stable invitation, provided that all agents report truthfully. The mechanism is
also strategy-proof.
Proof sketch. We provide our intuition behind the proof. If agent ai over-reports with
Li > li, it can only result in reducing the size of an invitation that the mechanism chooses,
but ai has an INC-preference and therefore ai has no incentive to over-report. If ai under-
reports with Li < li, either it does not change the invitation that the mechanism chooses
or it leads to an invitation whose size is not acceptable to ai (i.e., the size is still below her
threshold, li). A formal proof can be found in a long version of this paper.
Note that Theorem 3 implies that an INC-instance of ASIP always admit a stable invi-
tation because the mechanism always returns an invitation (possibly the empty invitation).
Contrary to the previous case where the conflict of interests between agents and the orga-
nizer lead to an impossibility result, we have obtained a strategy-proof mechanism that also
finds a maximum stable invitation when the interests of both parties align in INC-instances
of ASIP, which is to maximize attendance.
3.4.4 An Extension to Multiple Alternatives for Time
In Section 3.3.2, we discussed the setting with multiple alternatives for the time of the event
in the non-strategic case. In the strategic case, our impossibility result for the general case
is immediately implied. For INC-instances of ASIP, we report that even if there are only two
alternatives for the time, it is impossible to design a strategy-proof mechanism that finds a
stable invitation (we can construct an example that is similar to the one used in the proof
of Theorem 2). Our intuition is that, even if the interests of the agents and organizer align
to maximize attendance, preferences over alternatives for the time can incentivize agents
to misreport in order to lead to a more favorable outcome. In particular, over-reporting
(Li > li) can give an agent the veto power on certain alternatives for the time, which in
turn can lead to a more favorable outcome for the concerned agent.
3.4.5 Note on Randomized Mechanisms
Although we only discussed deterministic mechanisms, our results can be extended to ran-
domized mechanisms. Here is the general outline. First we define Z to be a mapping from
V to Π(U) where Π(U) denotes the set of all probability distributions over U . The defini-
tion of a strategy-proof mechanism must change accordingly – we do this by adopting the
axioms in the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem [2]. We introduce lotteries over
invitations and define preferences of agents over lotteries. Given a probability distribution
over invitations, one can compute the expected cardinal utility of lotteries. We then define
a strategy-proof mechanism analogously to Definition 4: for each ai, it must hold that the
expected utility of Z(Pi, v−i) is no less than the expected utility of Z(vi, v−i) for all vi ∈ Vi
and for all v−i ∈ V−i. We note that our impossibility result given by Theorem 2 still holds:
If (V, Z) is a strategy-proof mechanism, then Z(P1, P2) must assign zero probability to both
{a1} and {a2}, yet these are the only two stable invitations.
4 General Stable Invitation Problem
We have so far explored the problem of finding a maximum stable invitation in a setting
where agents are indifferent among the invitations of the same size. We now remove this
assumption and allow agents to specify their preferences over exactly which agents they like
or do not like to attend the event, in addition to their preferences over the size of invitations.
4.1 Definitions and Notation
Let us formally define the General Stable Invitation Problem (GSIP) and solution concepts.
Definition 5. An instance of the General Stable Invitation Problem (GSIP) is a tuple
(N,P, F,R) where N and P are defined the same as before (see Definition 1), F =
(F1, F2, . . . , Fn) is a collection of acceptance sets where Fi ⊆ (N \ {ai}) for each i, and
R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) is a collection of rejection sets where Ri ⊆ (N \ {ai}) for each i. We
interpret Fi and Ri as a constraint such that ai is willing to attend the event only if all
agents in Fi attend and no agent in Ri attends.
Given an instance (N,P, F,R) of GSIP, we say that it is an (α, β)-instance, where α =
maxai∈N |Fi| and β = maxai∈N |Ri|. It holds by definition that 0 ≤ α, β ≤ n − 1; in
particular empty acceptance sets and rejection sets are allowed in our definition. We will
later see that our easiness and hardness results rely on (α, β) values. Notice that any ASIP
instance is a (0, 0)-instance of GSIP, and therefore ASIP is a special case of GSIP.6
We define an invitation and its stability constraints the same way we did in Section 3.
Definition 6. An invitation for an instance (N,P, F,R) is a subset S of N , and is inter-
preted as the organizer invites the agents in S. An invitation S is said to be individually
rational if for every agent ai ∈ S it holds that Fi ⊆ S, Ri ∩ S = ∅, and |S| ≻i 0. An invita-
tion S is said to be envy-free if for every agent ai 6∈ S, S
′ = S ∪ {ai} is not an individually
rational invitation with respect to ai; that is, if at least one of the following holds: Fi 6⊆ S′,
Ri ∩ S′ 6= ∅, and |S′| = (|S| + 1) ≺i 0. An invitation is stable if it is both individually
rational and envy-free.
For each agent ai, we can naturally induce from Pi the preference of ai over the set of all
invitations, 2N , in the same manner as we did in Section 3.1. Therefore, the preferences of
agents over invitations are well-defined. Note that individual rationality and envy-freeness
are properties of an invitation, not preferences of agents, and therefore we define the induced
preferences over invitations to be independent of the properties of a solution concept.
Next we define a special class of preferences, called simple preferences.
Definition 7. Agent ai is said to have a simple preference, if agent ai strictly prefers any
outcome x ∈ X with x 6= 0 to her outside option, 0 (i.e. for all x ∈ X with x 6= 0, x ≻i 0).
Note that when an agent has a simple preference, she still has a preference ordering over
outcomes, but she strictly prefers attending to not attending.
We emphasize that in GSIP agents still have preferences over sizes of invitations. How-
ever, our hardness and impossibility results for GSIP are provided while assuming that all
agents have simple preferences. Note that this assumption strengthens our negative result
because it directly implies the same negative result for GSIP with arbitrary preferences. On
the other hand, we provide our easiness result for GSIP with arbitrary preferences, which
of course implies the same positive result for GSIP with simple preferences. Henceforth we
describe an instance of GSIP simply as (N,F,R) by omitting P when we assume that all
agents have simple preferences.
6We emphasize that agents still have preferences over outcomes in GSIP, although our results in this
section focus on how acceptance and rejection sets affect easiness and hardness of GSIP
4.2 Examples
Example 4 (Stable invitations are not unique). Suppose there are 4 agents denoted by N =
{a1, a2, a3, a4}. We assume that these agents have simple preferences, and their acceptance
sets and rejection sets are given by:
F1 = {a2} , F2 = {a1} , F3 = {a4} , F4 = {a3} ,
R1 = {a3} , R2 = {a4} , R3 = {a1} , R4 = {a2}.
Agents a1 and a2 have each other in their acceptance sets, while they reject agents a3
and a4, respectively. Similarly, agents a3 and a4 have each other in their acceptance sets,
while they reject agents a1 and a2, respectively. There are three stable invitations in this
example: ∅, {a1, a2}, and {a3, a4} (among 2|N | = 16 possible invitations). The latter two
are maximum stable invitations. One can easily verify that all other invitations are not
stable; for example, S = {a1, a3, a4} is not individually rational due to agents a1 and a3.
Example 5 (Stable invitations may not exist). Suppose there are 3 agents denoted by
N = {a1, a2, a3}. We assume that these agents have simple preferences, and their acceptance
sets and rejection sets are given by:
F1 = F2 = F3 = ∅ , R1 = {a2} , R2 = {a3} , R3 = {a1}.
All three agents accept no other agents, while they form a cyclic rejection-relationship.
It is easy to verify that there is no stable invitation in this example. The empty invitation
(i.e. S = ∅) is not envy-free because each agent then would rather attend the event. An
invitation with any single agent is not envy-free; for example if S = {a1}, then S is not
envy-free with respect to agent a2. An invitation with any pair of agents is not individually
rational; for example if S = {a2, a3}, then S is not individually rational with respect to a2.
The full invitation (i.e. S = N) is not individually rational due to each agent’s rejection set.
Therefore this example admits no stable invitation.
4.3 The Non-strategic Case
The decision problem of GSIP is whether a stable invitation of size at least k exists given
an instance of GSIP. We show that GSIP is NP-hard even if we assume truthful agents with
simple preferences. Note that NP-hardness for GSIP implies NP-completeness because GSIP
is clearly in NP (i.e. one can efficiently check whether a given invitation is stable).
Theorem 4 states that the decision problem of GSIP with simple preferences is NP-hard
even if the size of all acceptance sets and rejection sets are at most one. Moreover the theo-
rem states that the problem remains NP-hard even if we relax the stability requirement and
only seek a maximum individually rational invitation that may not be envy-free. Theorem 5
delivers a similar negative result even if we restrict to (0, 2)-instances of GSIP with simple
preferences. (All omitted proofs of this section can be found in a long version of this paper.)
Theorem 4. It is NP-hard to decide whether a (1, 1)-instance of GSIP admits a stable
invitation of size at least k, even if all agents have simple preferences. It is NP-hard to
decide whether a (1, 1)-instance of GSIP admits an individually rational invitation of size
at least k, even if all agents have simple preferences.
Theorem 5. It is NP-hard to decide whether a (0, 2)-instance of GSIP admits a stable
invitation of size at least k, even if all agents have simple preferences. It is NP-hard to
decide whether a (0, 2)-instance of GSIP admits an individually rational invitation of size
at least k, even if all agents have simple preferences.
Note that NP-hardness of (a, b)-instances implies NP-hardness of (α, β)-instances where
α ≥ a and β ≥ b and that NP-hardness for GSIP with simple preferences immediately implies
NP-hardness for GSIP with arbitrary preferences.
We now consider the remaining cases of GSIP whose computational complexity is not
implied by Theorem 4 and 5. We know that (0, 0)-instances of GSIP with arbitrary prefer-
ences are solvable in polynomial time because those are instances of ASIP. In addition if we
are given (1, 0)-instances or (0, 1)-instances of GSIP with arbitrary preferences, we can find
a maximum stable invitation in polynomial time.
Theorem 6. There exists a polynomial time algorithm that finds a maximum stable invi-
tation when given a (1, 0)-instance (N,P, F,R) of GSIP (with arbitrary preferences, P ).
Proof sketch. Given a (1, 0)-instance (N,P, F,R) of GSIP, we create a directed graph G =
(V,E) such that V = N (each node corresponds to an agent) and E = {(ai, aj) : aj ∈
Fi, ∀ai ∈ N}. An edge e = (ai, aj) has the direction from ai to aj . Since each node
contributes at most one edge, we know that each component of G either is a tree or contains
a cycle such that each node on the cycle is the root of a tree. Utilizing this structure of the
graph, we can determine for fixed k whether a stable invitation of size k exists in polynomial
time by using a dynamic programming algorithm. We omit details of the proof.
Theorem 7. There exists a polynomial time algorithm that finds a maximum stable invi-
tation when given a (0, 1)-instance (N,P, F,R) of GSIP (with arbitrary preferences, P ).
Proof sketch. Given a (0, 1)-instance (N,P, F,R) of GSIP, we create a directed graph G =
(V,E) analogous to the graph we constructed in the proof sketch of Theorem 6. We again
use a dynamic programming algorithm to determine whether a stable invitation of size k
exists in polynomial time. We omit details of the proof.
We emphasize that our algorithms for Theorems 6 and 7 rely on the restriction that each
agent’s acceptance set (rejection set, respectively) is limited to singleton sets or empty sets.
Finally, we consider (α, 0)-instances of GSIP when α ≥ 2. In this sub-class of GSIP, the
decision problem is in P if we assume simple preferences while it is NP-hard if we assume
arbitrary preferences. Recall that all of our results so far did not differ whether we assume
simple preferences or arbitrary preferences.
Theorem 8. It is NP-hard to decide whether a (α, 0)-instance of GSIP admits a stable
invitation of size at least k when agents can have arbitrary preferences and α ≥ 2.
Lemma 2. Given any (α, 0)-instance (N,F,R) of GSIP with simple preferences, the full
invitation is the unique maximum stable invitation.
Proof. Let S = N be the full invitation given any (α, 0)-instance (N,F,R) of GSIP with
simple preferences. Because S is the full invitation, we know that S is envy-free by definition.
For all ai ∈ S, we know that Fi ⊆ S = N and Ri = ∅ as β = 0, which implies that S is
individually rational. Therefore S is the unique maximum stable invitation.
While Lemma 2 is trivial, it is worth noting that the interests of the agents and organizer
align in this case, which enables us to efficiently find a maximum stable invitation.
We summarize our hardness and easiness results for the non-strategic case of GSIP in Ta-
ble 1. P denotes the existence of polynomial time algorithms and NP-C (NP-completeness)
denotes the hardness result. The entries in boldface remark the results we presented in this
work, while the other entries are directly implied by our results.7
7We note that the single entry (P∗) can be derived from the result of Darmann et al. [1].
We also emphasize that our NP-hardness results hold for both finding maximum stable
invitations and finding maximum individually rational invitations (which may not be envy-
free). Finding the maximum envy-free invitation is trivial because the full invitation is
always envy-free.
Simple Preferences Arbitrary Preferences
β = 0 β = 1 β ≥ 2 β = 0 β = 1 β ≥ 2
α = 0 P P NP-C P∗ P NP-C
α = 1 P NP-C NP-C P NP-C NP-C
α ≥ 2 P NP-C NP-C NP-C NP-C NP-C
Table 1: Computational complexity of finding maximum stable invitations and finding max-
imum individually rational invitations given an instance of GSIP.
4.4 The Strategic Case
Recall that our impossibility result for ASIP in the strategic case immediately implies the
same impossibility result for GSIP (with arbitrary preferences) because ASIP is a special
case of GSIP by restricting the acceptance set and rejection sets to empty sets. However
we obtain an impossibility result for another special case of GSIP in which we assume that
all agents have simple preferences, as stated in Lemma 3. This strengthens the hardness
results in the strategic case of GSIP. Although we do not formally define a mechanism and
strategy-proofness in the context of GSIP, the reader should assume definitions analogous
to the one provided in Section 3.4.1.
Lemma 3. There is no strategy-proof mechanism that finds a stable invitation when given
an instance of GSIP, even if we assume that all agents have simple preferences.
Proof. Consider a (0, 1)-instance of GSIP with two agents N = {a1, a2}. We assume that
these agents have simple preferences and their rejection sets are given by:
R1 = {a2} , R2 = {a1}.
Given (R1, R2), the only two stable invitations are S1 = {a1} and S2 = {a2}. Suppose
that a mechanism chooses S2 given (R1, R2). Then a1 has an incentive to misreport as if
her rejection set were empty (i.e. Rˆ1 = ∅).
Given (Rˆ1, R2), the only stable invitation is now S1 (and S2 is no longer envy-free with
respect to a1). Since S1 ≻1 0 ∼1 S2, agent a1 has an incentive to misreport her rejection
set. Similarly, if the mechanism were to choose S1 given (R1, R2), then a2 would have an
incentive to misreport with Rˆ2 = ∅. Therefore there is no strategy-proof mechanism that is
capable of finding a stable invitation.
In summary we have shown that the General Stable Invitation Problem (GSIP) is both
computationally and game-theoretically hard to solve, even if we assume simple preferences
of agents (which is a sub-class of GSIP). It is worth noting that the only positive result we
obtained for the strategic case is when all agents have anonymous INC-preferences (i.e. when
given an INC-instance of ASIP). Yet we believe that there are many other interesting ways
to tackle the problem despite our negative result, as we discuss in the next section.
5 Contributions and Future Work
The main contribution of this work is a thorough analysis of the Stable Invitation Prob-
lem from both the computational complexity perspective and game-theoretic perspective.
We first defined the Anonymous Stable Invitation Problem (ASIP) in which agents have
anonymous preferences over sizes of invitations. We showed that the problem of finding
a maximum stable invitation is solvable in polynomial time when agents are truthful, and
showed that it is in general impossible to design a strategy-proof mechanism when agents
are strategic. Yet we also discovered that when the interests of the agents and organizer
align, the strategic case of ASIP is solvable, by presenting a strategy-proof mechanism.
We then relaxed the assumption of anonymous preferences and introduced acceptance
sets and rejections sets by which agents can specify their constraints. We formally defined
the General Stable Invitation Problem (GSIP), and showed that in general it is NP-hard to
find a maximum stable invitation even if we assume truthful agents with simple preferences.
We also showed that the problem is still NP-hard when we only seek individually rational
invitations (that may not be envy-free). Yet we presented efficient algorithms that find a
maximum stable invitation for some special instances of GSIP with arbitrary preferences. In
the strategic case, an impossibility result for ASIP immediately implies the same negative
result for GSIP. However, we also obtained an impossibility result for GSIP with simple
preferences in which agents only care about the identities of attendees but not the size of
an invitation.
While this work answers many interesting questions with flavors of complexity and game-
theory, it also leaves many interesting open problems. In the Anonymous Stable Invitation
Problem, we argued that our easiness results can be extended to the case with multiple
alternatives for the time of the event. The underlying assumption we made is that the
organizer needs to pick a specific alternative for the time. However one can think of a
different setting where the same event can be held multiple times (for example, multiple
receptions during a long conference), and our results are not immediately applicable to
this setting. This generalization leads to stable matching problems, which is an interesting
direction for future work. In addition, our impossibility result is obtained partly due to
the conflict between strategy-proofness and capability of finding a solution; one can instead
seek a strategy-proof mechanism that is guaranteed to find an approximate solution, which
is another interesting direction.
In the General Stable Invitation Problem, we showed that the decision problem is com-
putationally hard to solve, but there has been much research devoted to developing approxi-
mation algorithms. Approximation algorithms are interesting of their own, but we are more
interested in designing efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof and are guaranteed to
find an approximate solution (with respect to the maximum stable solution). An interest-
ing question is to ask whether it is possible to design such mechanisms, and how good the
approximation factors can be. Another approach is to relax the stability requirements and
let both individual rationality and envy-freeness can be violated to a small extent, while
we seek a maximum solution. This leads to an optimization problem with soft-constraints
(instead of hard-constraints), and such problems are often solvable in polynomial time. We
can further investigate how one can design strategy-proof mechanisms in such settings, and
this is yet another direction for future work. Finally we can generalize the Stable Invitation
Problem even further to the weighted version, in which the organizer has a weight vector
over agents such that the organizer tries to maximize the sum of the weights of attendees
instead of the number of attendees.
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